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ANTITRUST
PROMETHEUS RADIO PROJECT V. FCC:
THE PERSISTENCE OF SCARCITY
By Aaron PerZanowski
A well-informed citizenry forms the very basis of a functioning de-
mocracy.I Newspapers, radio, television, and, more recently, the Internet
serve as essential wellsprings of information for the American public. Me-
dia concentration, because it results in an ever-decreasing number of
sources of publicly available information, poses a serious threat to the de-
velopment of an informed public.
Not surprisingly, the recent efforts by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to allow further consolidation among already concen-
trated sources of news and information have met with harsh and sustained
criticism.2 In 2003, the FCC called for significant deregulation of its limits
on media concentration. This Note examines these rule changes, their his-
torical context, the litigation they sparked, and their underlying justifica-
tion.
Part I traces the history of broadcast regulation, emphasizing the de-
velopment of the scarcity doctrine and the subsequent deregulatory trend.
Part II examines the FCC's 2003 rule changes and the Third Circuit's
analysis of those modifications in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC.3 Part
III analyzes the assumptions underlying the FCC's proffered explanation
for its rule changes, ultimately concluding that they lack justification, and
offers suggestions for responsible ownership deregulation. Part IV calls on
Congress to reassert itself as the final arbiter of media policy.
© 2005 Aaron Perzanowski
The author hereby permits the reproduction of this Note subject to the Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 License, the full terms of which can be accessed at
http://creativecommons.orgllicenses/by-sa/2.0/legalcode, and provided that the following
notice be preserved: "This note was first published by the Regents of the University of
California in the Berkeley Technology Law Journal's Annual Review of Law and Tech-
nology."
1. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 585 (1983) (stating "an informed public is the essence of working democracy").
2. See Gregory M. Prindle, No Competition: How Radio Consolidation Has Dimin-
ished Diversity and Sacrificed Localism, Note, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 279, 306-20 (2003); Brian Lowry, Viewers, It's Time to Wake Up and Smell the
Mergers, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at 6-1; Media Conglomeration, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
23, 2003, at A4.
3. 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BROADCAST REGULATION
Two trends mark the history of the FCC's efforts to regulate broad-
casters. The first tracked a steady increase in regulatory power. Initial
structural regulations gave way to content-based rules, both of which
found their justification in spectrum scarcity. The second trend, beginning
in the 1980s and continuing today, reversed the course charted by the FCC
in its first fifty years. Deregulation emerged as a primary goal of the
FCC, and the scarcity rationale, the basis for the regulations of the past,
came under fire.
A. The Development of the Scarcity Rationale
Since the early development of radio, the government has imposed
regulatory limits on use of the broadcast spectrum.5 As the incipient me-
dium's popularity grew, the inherent limitations of the broadcast spectrum
both motivated and justified increased federal oversight. 6 Broadcasting
provided a means of mass communication with a finite carrying capacity.
The widespread adoption of radio coupled with the scarcity of broadcast
frequencies created an environment that jeopardized the very functionality
of the technology. "The number of stations increased ... rapidly, .. . and
the situation became ... chaotic." 7 Without regulation, the crowded radio
spectrum risked incoherence.
4. The FCC's enforcement of broadcast decency standards, rather than decreasing
as part of the general deregulatory trend, has grown more aggressive. See Mathew C.
Holohan, Note, Politics, Technology, and Indecency: Rethinking Broadcast Regulation in
the 21st Century, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 341 (2005) (reviewing recent FCC enforce-
ment of decency standards and concluding that such enforcement is politically moti-
vated); Emily Fredrix, Viacom to Pay $3.5m in FCC Decency Cases, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 24, 2004, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/200
4/11/24/viacom to-pay_35m in fcc decency cases; Marilyn Geewax, FCC Chairman
Raises Profile; Powell Hardens Stance on Broadcast Decency, ATLANTA J. CONST., Sept.
24, 2004, at IF.
5. See Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912) (requiring sea-
based radio operators to obtain a license from the Secretary of Commerce and Labor).
6. Some have argued that broadcast regulations need not rely on the scarcity ra-
tionale. One commentator has suggested that regulations imposed on broadcasters could
find "firmer First Amendment footing" in the public forum doctrine. See Charles W.
Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality
of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CALF. L. REv. 1687 (1997). This result is justified by view-
ing the First Amendment to allow active govemmental promotion of robust debate on
issues of public concern, or alternatively, by emphasizing the quid pro quo of broadcast
licensing, whereby the access to a valuable and limited public resource granted to broad-
casters is conditioned upon their agreement to serve the public interest. See id.
7. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 211 (1943).
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The Communications Act of 1934 created the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, granting it the authority to regulate broadcasters.8 The
FCC's initial rules, required under the Act to further the "public interest,
convenience, or necessity," found their justification in the need to main-
tain radio's usability. 9 In addition to awarding licenses, the FCC limited
signal power, antenna height, and frequency.' 0 These structural regulations
guarded against interference resulting from overcrowded spectrum.
The FCC's rulemaking soon expanded to include limits on media
ownership. When the FCC denied a broadcast license in 1938 on the basis
of the applicant's control of another station, it established its first owner-
ship rule.'1 The duopoly rule prohibited the owner of a broadcast station
from controlling two stations in the same broadcast area.12 While the du-
opoly rule imposed limits on local concentration of broadcast facilities, the
first national ownership limits emerged in the 1940s. Under these regula-
tions, the FCC denied licenses to any entity controlling six radio stations
or three television stations nationwide.'
3
As the Supreme Court's decision in NBC v. United States demon-
strated, even the FCC's power to deny broadcast licenses found its justifi-
cation in spectrum scarcity. 14 Disposing of NBC's First Amendment chal-
lenge to the denial of its license application under the Chain Broadcasting
Regulations, 15 the Court explained, "Unlike other modes of expression,
radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and
that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental
regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must
be denied."' 16 Employing an inherently limited medium of expression,
broadcasters enjoy lessened First Amendment protections and can be en-
cumbered with greater regulatory burdens.
8. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
9. Id.
10. See FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. § 73.603 to .614 (2004).
11. See C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA.
L. REv. 839, 863 (2002).
12. High Frequency Broadcast Stations, 5 Fed. Reg. 2382, 2384 (June 26, 1940).
13. In re Amendment of Section 73.3555, [formerly 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636] of
the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television
Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984).
14. 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
15. The Chain Broadcasting Regulations were meant to limit the influence of net-
works on individual broadcast stations. The rules barred licensing of stations that agreed,
inter alia, to the following: exclusive network affiliation, territorial exclusivity, terms of
affiliation longer than two years, and network penalization for alterations of broadcast
airtime rates. See id. at 198-209.
16. Id. at 226.
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In the 1970s, these regulatory burdens reached their peak. The FCC in-
stituted a number of cross-ownership bans that prevented entities from
owning various media combinations. It established the first such rule in
1970, prohibiting television station owners from controlling cable systems
in the same broadcast area.1 7 Shortly thereafter, it barred common owner-
ship of television and radio stations in local communities.'i Finally, a pro-
hibition against newspaper and broadcast cross-ownership took effect in
1975.'9
The FCC's regulatory efforts included not only structural require-
ments, but content-based rules as well. In 1969, the Supreme Court exam-
ined the Fairness Doctrine, a long-standing FCC policy requiring broad-
casters to allocate equal time to both sides of issues of public concern.
20
Red Lion, a radio broadcaster, brought suit after the FCC demanded it
provide free airtime to an individual disparaged by Reverend Billy James
Hargis' "Christian Crusade" series broadcast by Red Lion.2' In upholding
the Fairness Doctrine, the Court offered its most perspicuous statement of
the scarcity rationale. Given the demand for access to limited spectrum,
the Court explained:
[I]f there is to be any effective communication by radio, only a
few can be licensed and the rest must be barred from the air-
waves. It would be strange if the First Amendment, aimed at pro-
tecting and furthering communications, prevented the Govern-
ment from making radio communication possible by requiring li-
censes to broadcast and by limiting the number of licenses so as
not to overcrowd the spectrum.22
Permitting unregulated use of spectrum would result in "chaos."2 3 The
FCC was therefore justified, according to the Court, in imposing content-
24based duties on those granted broadcast licenses.
17. See In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems, 23 F.C.C.2d 816, 820
(1970).
18. See In re Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commis-
sion's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast
Stations, 28 F.C.C.2d 662, 662 (1971).
19. See In re Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commis-
sion's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast
Stations, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1089 (1975).
20. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969).
21. Id. at 371.
22. Id. at 389.
23. Id. at 375.
24. Id. at 401.
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B. The Deregulatory Trend
The 1980s marked a turning point in broadcast regulation. While its
first five decades were characterized by a steady expansion of its regula-
tory powers, the FCC initiated a march towards the deregulation of broad-
cast media during the Reagan era. Among the first targets were the con-
tent-based requirements of the Fairness Doctrine. In 1985, the FCC re-
leased its Fairness Report, repudiating the doctrine and claiming that it no
longer served any purpose and that it chilled expression.25 When Congress
passed legislation reinstituting the Fairness Doctrine in 1987, President
Reagan vetoed it.
26
By the mid-1990s the deregulatory fervor had reached Congress. The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 codified the congressional preference
for broadcast deregulation. It eliminated the National Radio Cap, 27 which
limited the total number of radio stations an entity can control. Further,
the Act required the FCC to conduct biennial reviews of its regulations in
order to eliminate any rules no longer necessary to the public interest.
29
The FCC's biennial review process sparked litigation from its incep-
tion. In 1998, in its first such review, the FCC determined that the national
television ownership rule and the cable/broadcast cross-ownership rule
furthered the public interest and announced their retention.30 The Fox net-
work brought suit in the D.C. Circuit challenging this decision. The court
in Fox Television Stations v. FCC held that the FCC had failed to provide
25. See In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regula-
tions Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102
F.C.C.2d 145, 147 (1985).
26. See S. 742, 100th Cong. (1987).
27. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(a), Pub L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
("The [FCC] shall modify section 73.3555 of its regulations (47 C.F.R. 73.3555) by
eliminating any provisions limiting the number of AM or FM broadcast stations which
may be owned or controlled by one entity nationally.").
28. Since the elimination of the National Radio Cap, concentration of the radio mar-
ket has increased markedly. Clear Channel Communications, the nation's largest radio
broadcaster, owns over 1200 radio stations, and according to many accounts is largely
responsible for the homogenization of radio programming throughout the United States.
See Loren Steffy, KLOL Just Wasn't Music to Ears of Radio Marketers, HOUSTON
CHRON., Nov. 19, 2004, Business, at 1.
29. See 47 U.S.C. 161 (2000); Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h), Pub L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
30. In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review - Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 11,058, 11,061 (2000).
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adequate justification for its decision. 3 1 The court vacated the cross-
ownership rule but remanded the national television ownership rule to the
FCC for further justification or revision.32
Shortly after its decision in Fox, the D.C. Circuit evaluated the FCC's
retention of the local television ownership rule in Sinclair Broadcast
Group v. FCC.33 The court upheld the FCC's retention of the rule despite
Sinclair Broadcasting's contention that the "eight independent voices"
rule, which barred any merger that would result in fewer than eight station
owne rs in a given market, lacked sufficient justification. 34 It did, however,
remand on the issue of excluding non-broadcast media from the eight
voices rule.
35
The FCC addressed the rules remanded in Fox and Sinclair, among
others, in its 2002 biennial review. This review culminated with the most
sweeping deregulatory changes yet introduced by the FCC: the 2003 Or-
der36 scrutinized by the Third Circuit in Prometheus.
I. THE ORDER AND PROMETHEUS
The Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("The Or-
der") issued by the FCC on July 2, 2003 marked a new zenith in the FCC's
push towards the deregulation of broadcast media. While it did not call for
an end to ownership regulation, The Order marked a significant step to-
wards total deregulation, a position advocated by some commentators,
among them, former FCC Chairman Mark Fowler.37 It called for signifi-
cant loosening of the FCC's restrictions on media ownership and allowed
previously prohibited levels of concentration both within and between
media.38 The Order significantly increased the national television owner-
31. 280 F.3d 1027, 1053 (D.C. Cir.), amended en banc by 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
32. Id.
33. See 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
34. Id. at 169.
35. Id.
36. In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broad-
cast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620 (2003) [hereinafter The Order].
37. See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broad-
cast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 207 (1981-82); Note, Paying Attention to Justice: The
FCC and the Failure to Deregulate, 11 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 62 (2002); James Gattuso, The
Myth of Media Concentration: Why the FCC's Media Ownership Rules Are Unnecessary
(May 29, 2003), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternetandTechnology/
wm284.cfm.
38. See The Order, supra note 36, at 13,953 (Commissioner Copps, dissenting).
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ship cap 39 and eliminated the remaining cross-ownership rules, replacing
them with a new rule that allowed greater control and concentration across
media. 40 The Order relaxed the local television ownership rule, allowing
owners to control up to three stations in the same market and created a
new method of calculating market size for the purpose of controlling local
radio concentration.4'
The proposed rulemaking met with immediate and vocal opposition.
The public spoke out,42 Congress legislated,43 and litigants filed suit. Doz-
ens of petitioners filed to challenge the FCC's Order, and those challeng-
ing the rules fell into two distinct categories. The citizen petitioners,
among them the Prometheus Radio Project, argued, inter alia, that The
Order violated the FCC's public interest obligation and sacrificed diversity
of media sources and viewpoints by allowing increased concentration of
ownership. The deregulatory petitioners, composed of networks, broad-
casters, and industry associations, insisted that The Order failed to go far
enough in removing regulatory impediments. Pursuant to the random lot-
tery selection process for challenges to administrative rulemakings, 44 the
suits of these petitioners were consolidated and heard by the Third Circuit.
39. Id. at 13,815.
40. Id. at 13,790.
41. Id. at 13,668.
42. The public reaction to the FCC's efforts to reform its media ownership regula-
tions was swift and unambiguous. Prior to the official publication of The Order, the FCC
received comments from nearly two million citizens in response to its review of owner-
ship regulations. Id. at 13,977-78. Over 99.9% of those comments voiced objections to
increased consolidation. Membership-driven organizations ranging from the American
Civil Liberties Union to the National Rifle Ass'n opposed further concentration among
media owners, as did city councils in cities such as Chicago, Philadelphia, and San Fran-
cisco. Id.
43. In the months following The Order, a bipartisan effort to reverse the FCC's new
rules took shape in Congress. Although the vast majority of Democrats and a significant
Republican minority sought a rollback of The Order, ultimately the "aggressive political
tactics" of the pro-FCC minority in Congress blocked such attempts. Ben Scott, The Poli-
tics and Policy of Media Ownership, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 645, 655 (2004). The Senate
passed a bill stripping The Order's rules of any force or effect that languished in the
House and was never put to a vote. See 108 S.J. Res. 17, 108th Congress (2003). In the
end, the Congressional concern over media concentration resulted in only minor altera-
tions of the FCC's rules. In 2004, Congress set the national television ownership cap at
39%, choosing a limit between the FCC's prior 35% cap and the proposed 45% limit. See
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99-100
(2004). Additionally, Congress exempted the national television cap and related rules,
including the UHF discount, from further review under § 202(h). Id.
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (2000).
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A. The Third Circuit's Analysis
The Prometheus court examined The Order's revisions of the cross-
ownership, local television, and local radio regulations, ultimately finding
significant deficiencies in the rationale underlying each of the FCC's rule
changes.45 In evaluating the rules, the court was bound by both the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act and § 202(h) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to set aside administra-
tive actions that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or oth-
erwise not in accordance with the law.' '46 The Telecommunications Act in
§ 202(h) calls for periodic review of FCC rules to determine their contin-
ued importance to achieving the public interest, defined primarily in refer-
ence to the FCC's three core values: diversity, competition, and local-
ism. 47 Any rule failing to advance the public interest must be repealed or
modified.
The court's inquiry focused on each of the Order's rule changes in
turn, outlining both the prior regulations and their modification, and ana-
lyzing the propriety of the rule changes under the relevant standards.
1. Cross Ownership
The FCC's previous rules governing cross-ownership applied two dis-
tinct regulations to owners depending on the forms of media at issue.48
The newspaper/broadcast rule prohibited the owner of a daily newspaper
from owning any broadcast station in the same market.4 9 The ra-
dio/television rule provided market-relative limits to the number of radio
stations, if any, the owner of a television station could possess.
5 0
The new rule promulgated by the FCC eliminated both of these cross-
ownership restrictions, replacing them with a new comprehensive market-
relative cross-ownership regulation.5 1 In markets of three or fewer televi-
sion stations, the new standard permitted no cross ownership of television,
45. The court deemed moot the changes made to the national television ownership
rule in light of the intervening legislation readjusting the numeric limit and exempting the
rule from further biennial review. See supra note 43.
46. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
47. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 202(h), Pub L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
48. The Fox court previously eliminated the cable/broadcast rule, which prevented
common ownership of cable and broadcast stations in the same community. See Fox
Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1053 (D.C. Cir.), amended en banc by 293
F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
49. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (2004).
50. Id. § 73.3555(c).
51. See The Order, supra note 36, at 13,790.
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radio, or newspapers. 52 In markets with four to eight television stations,
the rule permitted a single entity to own a newspaper and either (1) a tele-
vision station and 50% of the radio stations permitted under the local radio
ownership rules, or (2) 100% of the radio stations allowable under the lo-
cal radio rule.53 In the largest markets, those with more than eight TV sta-
tions, cross-ownership was left entirely unregulated.
5 4
In examining the new cross-ownership rule, the Prometheus court
found that because the merger of local broadcast and newspaper ventures
can potentially increase local news coverage by increasing efficiency and
does not necessarily create significant harms to diversity, the FCC offered
sufficient justification for its elimination of the newspaper/broadcast
rule.55 In addition, according to the court, the FCC's retention of some
regulations over media ownership violated neither the First nor the Fifth
Amendment, despite the contention of the deregulatory petitioners.56
While the language of the regulation is couched in terms of restrictions
placed on newspaper owners, the court held that the regulations applied
equally to all media owners, and therefore, did not violate the Fifth
Amendment's equal protection clause.57 Although the rule may hamper
the ability of potential media cross-owners to speak to a larger audience,
the court, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in National Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting,58 justified such restrictions on First Amend-
ment protections on the basis of spectrum scarcity.
59
Despite sanctioning the general approach of the FCC's new rule, the
court remanded on the issue of the specific numeric limits created by the
cross-ownership rule.60 The court objected to the assumptions made by the
FCC in creating the Diversity Index, a metric used to determine speaker
diversity within communities for the purpose of establishing the appropri-
ate cross-ownership regulations. 6 1 Specifically, the court found that the
weight given to Internet news sources in calculating the Diversity Index
lacked justification.62 Further, the court objected to the unrealistic assump-
tion made by the FCC of equal market share between stations within a
52. Id. at 13,799.
53. Id. at 13,803.
54. Id. at 13,804.
55. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 397 (3d Cir. 2004).
56. Id. at 400.
57. Id. at401.
58. FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978).
59. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 401.
60. Id. at 403.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 405.
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given medium.63 Finally, the court found that the FCC applied the results
of the Index in an inconsistent manner, allowing increases of Diversity
Index scores in some instances that were larger than increases prohibited
under other circumstances.
64
2. Local Television Ownership
Prior to its 2003 rulemaking, the FCC allowed duopolies, ownership of
two television stations by the same firm within a given market, if two
stipulations were satisfied: (1) no owner can control two of the top four
most-viewed stations in a market and (2) at least eight "independent
voices" must remain after the proposed merger.65 In constrast, the FCC's
new rule allowed much greater consolidation by permitting triopolies in
markets of eighteen or more stations and duopolies in markets of seven-
teen or fewer stations. 66 The "top four" rule remained applicable, effec-
tively recluding duopolies in markets with fewer than five television sta-
tions.
The court upheld the retention of the "top four" rule despite the de-
regulatory petitioners' claim that it unfairly prevented stations in small
markets from achieving the efficiencies of consolidation.68 The court
agreed with the FCC's determination that the likely harm to viewpoint di-
versity resulting from consolidation in such markets outweighed the likely
benefits of increased efficiency.
69
However, the court found the specific numerical limits created by the
rule arbitrary.7 ° In formulating its rule, the FCC failed to account for the
actual market share of the stations at issue, considering mergers of the
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth most watched stations as equiva-
lent to common ownership of the fourth, fifth, and sixth rated stations in a
given market. Further, the court insisted the FCC provide justification for
allowing market concentration that exceeds the FCC's own target Diver-
sity Index score.
71
63. Id. at 409.
64. Id. at411.
65. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (2000); In re Review of the Commission's Regula-
tions Governing Television Broadcasting, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, 12,907-08 (1999).
66. The Order, supra note 36, at 13,668.
67. Id.
68. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 417.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 420.
71. Id.
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3. Local Radio Ownership
Finally, the court considered the local radio rule. The Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 stipulated that in markets of forty-five or more stations,
a single entity may own up to eight stations, with up to five in any one ser-
vice (AM or FM) 72 The rule permitted firms to own seven stations (up to
four in one service) in markets with 30-44 stations, six stations (four in a
service) in markets of 15-29 stations, and five stations (three in a service)
in markets of less than fifteen stations provided no company controls more
than 50% of the local market.73
The new rule made no changes to the numerical restrictions, but it did
significantly alter the method used to calculate the total number of stations
in a market, the "denominator." While the previous method considered
only commercial stations in calculating the denominator, the new ap-
proach included both commercial and noncommercial stations.74 Sec-
ondly, the new method abandoned the transaction-specific "contour over-
lap" method for counting stations in a market, instead employing an objec-
tive geographic standard employed by Arbitron.
75
The court upheld the FCC's decision to make use of the Arbitron sys-
tem because of demonstrated flaws in the contour overlap method that
created a "perverse incentive" to merge the largest, most powerftl stations
in a market.76 Despite the objections of the citizen petitioners, the court
also held that the inclusion of noncommercial stations in the denominator
calculation posed no threat to diversity because the net effect of the new
approach was a decrease in denominators in most markets.77
72. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(b), Pub L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
73. Id.
74. See The Order, supra note 36, at 13,713.
75. Arbitron is the nation's leading provider of radio ratings. It has established geo-
graphic radio markets for most U.S. urban areas. See id. at 13,712.
76. Id at 13,719. The contour overlap method involved first calculating the "nu-
merator," the number of commonly owned stations within a market, by adding all com-
monly owned stations with overlapping principal community signal contours. Next the
"demoninator," the total number of stations in the relevant market, was calculated by
adding to the numerator any stations whose contours overlap with at least one of the sta-
tions in the numerator. A party was "deemed to own only those stations ... that have
mutually overlapping principal community contours." Id. at 13,718. The denominator
calculation, however, included all stations "whose principal community contour overlaps
the principal community contour of at least one of the radio stations in the numerator...
regardless of who owns that station." Id. The denominator, therefore, could include radio
stations owned by the same party that owns the radio stations represented in the numera-
tor but were not counted against the party's ownership limit. See id.
77. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 426 (3d Cir. 2004).
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Although the numerical limits were not revised, the court remanded
them for further justification by the FCC. The court expressed doubt as to
the effectiveness of the regulations in promoting the FCC's goal of creat-
ing five equal-sized competitors in each market and, further, questioned
the propriety of that particular goal in achieving the public interest. 
1 8
B. Arbitrary Rule or Unwise Policy?
At first glance, the Third Circuit's ruling in Prometheus appears to be
an unremarkable application of the standards of administrative review.
Upon closer inspection, while the court couched its decision in the lan-
guage of administrative law, it remanded each of the FCC's numeric limits
on the basis of policy concerns rather than any failure to meet the relevant
administrative standards. The court's decision reflects its disapproval of
the FCC's policy choices rather than a determination that the rules were
"arbitrary and capricious" or violated the FCC's public interest obligation.
In NBC, the Supreme Court addressed the application of both the "ar-
bitrary and capricious" and "public interest" standards in regard to a chal-
lenged FCC regulation, clearly outlining the appropriate role of the courts
in such determinations. 79 Denying NBC's challenge to the Chain Broad-
casting Regulations, the court explained:
The Regulations are assailed as "arbitrary and capricious." If this
contention means that the Regulations are unwise, that they are
not likely to succeed in accomplishing what the Commission in-
tended, we can say only that the appellants have selected the
wrong forum for such a plea. What was said in Board of Tiade v.
United States, 319 U.S. 534, 548 [1942], is relevant here: "We,
certainly have neither technical competence nor legal authority
to pronounce upon the wisdom of the course .taken by the Com-
mission." Our duty is at an end when we find that the action of
the Commission was based upon findings supported by evidence,
and was made pursuant to authority granted by Congress. It is
not for us to say that the "public interest" will be furthered or re-
80tarded by the Chain Broadcasting Regulations.
The Prometheus court disregarded the narrow test formulated in NBC
and applied its own contradictory standard of review. The Supreme Court
warned against questioning the wisdom of the FCC's rules, their likeli-
hood of success, or the quality of their evidentiary support. The Prome-
78. See id. at 432-34.
79. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943).
"80. Id.
[Vol. 20:743
PROMETHEUS RADIO PROJECT v. FCC
theus court, however, challenged the FCC's rulemaking on each of these
proscribed grounds.
The FCC justified its local radio rule, in part, by contending that the
rule furthered its goal of achieving five equal-sized competitors in each
rndio market. The Third Circuit, in conflict with the Supreme Court's di-
rective in NBC, doubted the effectiveness of the local radio limits in
achieving the FCC's five equal-sized competitor goal8' and questioned
that goal's importance to the public interest.8 2 The FCC relied on game
theory justifications to support the five equal-sized competitor goal.8 The
court, citing an apparent discrepancy between the scholarly research upon
which the FCC's goal relied and recent Merger Guidelines introduced by
the Federal Trade Commission, questioned the expedience of the five
equal-sized competitor goal.8 4 In doing so, the court doubted both the wis-
dom of the FCC's objective and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
it.
Further, the court disapproved of the methodology used to calculate
the Diversity Index, a metric central to both the cross-ownership and local
television ownership rules, citing empirically flawed assumptions em-
ployed in calculating the index.85 In calculating the Diversity Index, the
FCC considered the impact of the Internet on viewpoint diversity. The
court contended that the FCC was incorrect in its assumption that the
Internet significantly increased the availability of diverse viewpoints on
local issues. It questioned the accuracy of the FCC's survey that indicated
Internet sites as a source of news programming because that survey failed
to distinguish between independent news sources, which increase source
and viewpoint diversity, and those that merely republish information
available from more traditional sources, which do not.86 The court then
attempted to distinguish between the quality of the content created by tra-
ditional media sources and individual online contributors, ultimately con-
cluding that such independent voices cannot be Considered "media out-
,,87lets. In attempting to define what sources of news and information are
81. The court found that the numerical limits could not "rationally be derived" from
a five equal-sized competitor goal. This determination comports more closely with the
Supreme Court's directive in NBC. The limits failed to result in such equally divided
markets in the past. Further, the FCC ignored actual market share, a statistic essential to
its goal, in formulating the numerical limits. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 433-34.
82. Id. at 432-34.
83. The Order, supra note 36, at 13,731.
84. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 433.
85. Id. at 405.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 407.
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appropriately considered media outlets and criticizing the studies con-
ducted by the FCC, the court presumed a "technical competence" explic-
itly denied by the Supreme Court.
88
The Prometheus court, by providing a policy-driven determination in a
case requiring application of administrative standards and deference to
administrative expertise, ignored its proper role and "substituted its own
policy judgment for that of the Federal Communications Commission." 89
The court's overreaching decision points to deep misgivings regarding the
FCC's rule changes and the policy goals that prompted them. In the dis-
cussion below, this Note suggests a likely source of the concern that moti-
vated the Prometheus court to remand the rule changes. The Note also en-
deavors to show that while the court failed to apply the appropriate stan-
dard of review, its decision was far from misguided as a matter of media
policy.
III. SCARCITY IN THE NEW MEDIA MARKETPLACE
The scarcity rationale has long faced criticism.90 Technological devel-
opments in recent decades have increased the calls for its abandonment.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the FCC's attempt to deny the relevance
of scarcity rests on untenable assumptions. Impartial reflection on the cur-
rent media marketplace reveals that the scarcity doctrine remains both ap-
plicable and essential despite recent changes in the distribution of content.
A. The Denial of Scarcity
Although the FCC offered numerous justifications for its rule changes,
one assumption underpins the sweeping deregulations called for in The
Order: the diminished relevance of scarcity in establishing ownership lim-
its. While the dearth of available spectrum continues to limit speech op-
portunities for would-be broadcasters, according to the FCC scarcity no
longer justifies the ownership restrictions of the past because changes in
the media marketplace have diminished its importance. As The Order ex-
plained:
Today's media marketplace is characterized by abundance ...
[N]ew modes of media have transformed the landscape, provid-
ing more choice, greater flexibility, and more control than at any
other time in history. Today we can access news, information,
88. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943)
89. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 435 (Scircia, J., dissenting).
90. See e.g., R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON.
1(1959).
(Vol. 20:743
PROMETHEUS RADIO PROJECT v. FCC
and entertainment in many enhanced and non-traditional ways
via: cable and satellite television, digital transmission, personal
and portable recording and playback devices, handheld wireless
devices, and perhaps the most extraordinary communications de-
velopment, the Internet. In short the number of outlets for na-
tlnnl nnd lnpn'l npxx'i infnrrmntinn nnrl Pntprtninm~nt ic lprap
and growing.91'
Today, information consumers enjoy access to an unprecedented vol-
ume of media content. The local newspaper and broadcast stations no
longer form the limits of our media exposure. Cable and satellite television
offer hundreds of channels, satellite radio supplies new content, and the
Internet provides access to a seemingly infinite number of information
sources. Since these new distribution channels provide greater access to
more information, the FCC contends, the need for diversity in broadcast
media is lessened and relaxed regulations are justified. Two propositions
underlie the FCC's denial of the continued importance of scarcity: the
abundance of new outlets and the substitutability of media. Under inspec-
tion, both of these assumptions fail.
B. The Continued Relevance of Scarcity
Despite the FCC's quixotic belief in the power of new technology to
radically restructure the media marketplace scarcity remains a vital con-
sideration in crafting thoughtful regulatory policies. The availability of
new distribution channels alone fails to justify the FCC's de-emphasis on
scarcity because such an increase cannot guarantee concomitant increases
in media outlets or, by extension, diverse viewpoints. Even where new
methods of content distribution do give rise to new outlets, implicit in the
FCC's reasoning is an unsupported belief in the substitutability of media.
92
In order to reduce the importance of spectrum scarcity, consumers must
treat these newly available outlets as equivalents of the traditional broad-
cast media. Only by serving as market substitutes can these new outlets
decrease the burden on the limited electromagnetic spectrum, justifying
relaxed regulation. The failure of the FCC's assumptions, coupled with the
continued demand for access to the limited broadcast spectrum, requires
recommitment to the scarcity rationale and the regulatory obligations it
demands.
91. The Order, supra note 36, at 13,647.
92. See Enrique Armijo, Public Airwaves, Private Mergers: Analyzing the FCC's
Faulty Justifications for the 2003 Media Ownership Rule Changes, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1482,
1494 (2004).
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1. Outlets, Sources, Distribution, and Diversity
While the FCC is undoubtedly correct that more media outlets exist
today than at any point in our past, its conclusion that viewpoint diversity
is adequately served in the new media environment lacks justification. The
FCC recognizes several types of diversity. Viewpoint diversity, chief
among the FCC's diversity goals, ensures that the public is exposed to
competing and differing perspectives on important issues.93 Both outlet
diversity (the presence of multiple independent media owners in a market)
and source diversity (the availability of content from a variety of produc-
ers) serve the greater goal of achieving a multiplicity of viewpoints. 94
While increases in outlet and source diversity tend to yield greater view-
point diversity, the abundance of non-broadcast media content offers no
guarantee of viewpoint diversity.
The ownership of non-broadcast media receives far less scrutiny than
that of broadcast stations. As a result, the same corporations that dominate
broadcasting control many non-broadcast media providers. While cable
and satellite provide hundreds of unique channels to viewers, 90% of the
most watched non-broadcast television channels are owned by the same
corporations that control the broadcast networks and cable systems. 95 In
fact, just six owners control 80% of the top ninety-one cable channels. 96
Because nearly all of the top twenty news sites are owned by large media
conglomerates, the Internet fares no better.
97
Technology provoked a rapid increase in availability of news and in-
formation. This technology, however, provides merely a means of distri-
bution. It offers both new and existing media owners an additional method
by which they can disseminate the content they license, purchase, or cre-
ate. Technology alone cannot ensure diversity of outlet ownership nor can
it guarantee the independent production necessary for source diversity.
Consequently, the technology of the new media marketplace fails to se-
cure greater viewpoint diversity, and cannot justify the loosening of
broadcast regulations meant to safeguard such a variety of viewpoints.
93. See The Order, supra note 36, at 13,627.
94. See id. at 13,632-33.
95. See id. at 13,953 (Commissioner Copps, dissenting).
96. See id. at 13,981 (Commissioner Adelstein, dissenting).
97. See Newspapers Run 8 of Top 20 News Sites, EDITOR & PUBLISHER MAG., Feb.
20, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Editor & Publisher Magazine File; American Press In-
stitute, Top 20 Current Events & Global News Sites Nielsen//NetRatings, November
2002, at http://www.cyberjoumalist.net/features/netratings/1 102netratings.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 10, 2005) (citing Nielsen//NetRatings).
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A daily newspaper with an Internet presence provides the same infor-
mation via two vehicles for delivery. Although the ready accessibility of
information offers a public benefit, the two distribution channels offered
by the New York Times and www.nytimes.com, for example, represent
neither two independent media sources nor two distinct outlets. Instead,
they offer only two centrally controlled distribution channels for nearly
identical content and, therefore, cannot materially contribute to increased
viewpoint diversity. On a larger scale, the fifteen national cable channels
and thirty-nine broadcast television channels owned by Viacom present a
similar concern.98 As the number of channels offered by local cable sys-
tems increases, the number of media conglomerates controlling their con-
tent does not.
The FCC's understanding of the media marketplace is tainted by a
crucial conflation. The FCC misconstrues newly created means of distrib-
uting content as newly developed and independent outlets for information
providing diverse viewpoints. The media marketplace is characterized not
by an abundance of viewpoints, but by an abundance of distribution chan-
nels through which media owners can pump a single point of view. This
mischaracterization of the media marketplace undermines the central justi-
fication for the FCC's relaxation of the ownership rules.
98. Viacom's cable holdings include: BET (Black Entertainment Television), CMT
(Country Music Television), Comedy Central, Flix, MTV (Music Television), MTV2
(Music Televesion 2), Nick at Nite, Nickelodeon, NOGGIN, Showtime, Spike TV, TMC
(The Movie Channel), The Sundance Channel , TV Land, VH 1. Its broadcast television
holdings include: KAUT-TV (Oklahoma City, Okla.), KBHK-TV (San Francisco, Cal.),
KCAL (Los Angeles, Cal.), KCBS-TV (Los Angeles, Cal.), KCCO (Alexandria, Minn.),
KCCW (Walker, Minn.), KCNC-TV (Denver, Colo.), KDKA-TV (Pittsburgh, Pa.),
KEYE-TV (Austin, Tex.), KMAX-TV (Sacramento, Cal.), KPIX-TV (San Francisco,
Cal.), KSTW-TV (Seattle, Wash.), KTVT-TV (Dallas-Fort Worth, Tex.), KTXA-TV
(Dallas, Tex.), KUSG (Washington, Utah), KUTV-TV (Salt Lake City, Utah), KYW-TV
(Philadelphia, Pa.), WBBM-TV (Chicago, I11.), WBFS-TV (Miami, Fla.), WBZ-TV (Bos-
ton, Mass.), WCBS-TV (New York, N.Y.), WCCO-TV (Minneapolis, Minn.), WFOR-
TV (Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), WFRV-TV (Green Bay, Wis.), WGNT-TV (Norfolk-
Portsmouth, Va.), WJMN (Escanaba, Wis.), WJZ-TV (Baltimore, Md.), WKBD-TV (De-
troit, Mich.), WLWC-TV (Providence, R.I.), WNDY-TV (Indianapolis, Ind.), WNPA-TV
(Pittsburgh, Pa.), WPSG-TV (Philadelphia, Pa.), WSBK-TV (Boston, Mass.), WTOG-TV
(Tampa, Fla.), WTVX-TV (West Palm Beach, Fla.), WUPA-TV (Atlanta, Ga.), WUPL-
TV (New Orleans, La.), WWHO-TV (Columbus, Ohio), and WWJ-TV (Detroit, Mich.).
Viacom's other holdings include Paramount Pictures, Paramount Home Entertainment,
publisher Simon & Schuster, television producer and distributor King World Productions,
and over 150 radio stations nationwide. See Who Owns What: Viacom, at http://www.
cjr.org/tools/owners/viacom.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
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2. The Non-Fungibility of Media
The FCC's assumption that non-broadcast media can serve as equal
substitutes for traditional broadcast channels faces significant difficulty.
Broadcasters occupy a unique place in our culture. Broadcast content is
pervasive, popular, responsive, and valuable. For these reasons, non-
broadcast media are unlikely to fulfill the same needs for the viewing pub-
lic.
As the Court noted in Red Lion, "[L]ong experience in broadcasting
[and] confirmed habits of listeners and viewers.., give existing broad-
casters a substantial advantage over new entrants, even where new entry is
technologically possible." 99 Few American homes lack a television.
100
Nearly every home and automobile in America has a radio. 01 The freely
available content broadcast over the air presents few barriers to viewing
and listening. As a result of the pervasive character of broadcasting, 90%
of American adults watch television on a daily basis, 10 2 and more than
75% of Americans listen to the radio every day. 10 3 Not only do Americans
regularly tune in to broadcast programming, they rely on it as their pri-
mary source of news and information. A recent study conducted by the
Pew Internet and American Life Project showed that 89% of Americans
received most of their news about the war in Iraq from television pro-
gramming, while only 17% of Internet users cited Internet sites as their
primary source of information. 10 4 Although television viewing among
Internet users continues to decline, television remains the dominant source
of news and information.'
0 5
While the statistics above fail to differentiate between broadcast and
non-broadcast television, two key characteristics differentiate these media.
Broadcast television provides free over-the-air access to news and infor-
mation. Cable and satellite providers, on the other hand, charge fees for
access to the channels they deliver. Continued emphasis on maintaining
diversity of broadcast viewpoints serves a crucial role in assuring quality
99. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969).
100. See Media Info Center, at http://mediainfocenter.org/compare/penetration (last
visited on Mar. 9, 2005).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. LEE RAINIE ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET
AND THE IRAQ WAR: How ONLINE AMERICAN HAVE USED THE INTERNET TO LEARN WAR
NEWS, UNDERSTAND EVENTS, AND PROMOTE THEIR VIEWS 2 (2004), available at http://
www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP-IraqWarReport.pdf.
105. Online Publishers Ass'n, Generational Media Study (Sept. 21, 2004), at
http://www.online-publishers.org/pdf/opagenerational-studysep04.pdf.
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programming for all. Secondly, broadcast stations, along with daily news-
papers, provide essential coverage of local issues. Cable networks, be-
cause of their national audience and centralized facilities, are unmotivated
and ill equipped to cover issues of local concern. Similarly, widely read
Internet news sources focus on national and international news and fail to
serve as a substitute for the local coverage offered by broadcasters.
The continued value of broadcast stations provides perhaps the clearest
evidence of the non-substitutability of broadcast and non-broadcast media.
If Internet sites, for example, served as equal substitutes for broadcast sta-
tions, we should expect to see station owners abandoning their expensive
broadcast enterprises and adopting a low cost Internet-only media strategy.
Instead, the value of broadcast stations continues to soar. Stations in major
markets have sold at prices approaching $1 billion.'0 6 The continued de-
mand for broadcast stations, even in the face of low cost online dissemina-
tion, demonstrates the unique value of broadcasting.
The Prometheus court's decision finds ample support in an examina-
tion of the FCC's underlying justification for The Order's rule changes.
Although new technology has provoked rapid and widespread changes in
the media marketplace, those developments fail to undermine the impor-
tance of spectrum scarcity. Because new distribution methods can neither
promise viewpoint diversity nor offer substitutability with broadcast me-
dia, the inherent limitations of broadcast media continue to justify the
regulation of media owners who enjoy access to a limited and valuable
public resource.
C. The Future of Deregulation
The FCC's attempts at deregulation, while premature, may not be fun-
damentally misguided. Under the appropriate circumstances, the deregula-
tion of broadcast ownership may prove a responsible policy.
The emergence of independent, widely available, and popular non-
broadcast media provide the most likely justification for ownership de-
regulation. In a media environment truly characterized by abundant, inde-
pendent, and pervasive non-broadcast media outlets, the criticisms leveled
against the FCC's rule changes hold less sway. This is particularly so if
those outlets offer local content, because each of the FCC's overarching
policy goals--diversity, localism, and competition-would be satisfied.
While such a shift appears likely in time, it is not guaranteed. Nor would it
remove all justification for regulating the use of broadcast spectrum.' 07
106. See The Order, supra note 36, at 13,983 (Commissioner Adelstein, dissenting).
107. See Logan, supra note 6, at 1687.
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Secondly, the development and adoption of efficiency enhancing spec-
trum technology, coupled with a democratization of spectrum allocation,
could reduce the need for broadcast media ownership rules. Developing
technologies offer more economical use of available spectrum. Spread
spectrum 10 and cognitive radio10 9 both hold the promise of allowing more
individuals to communicate over the air and reducing the impact of spec-
trum scarcity. While these technologies are not designed to operate with
existing radio and television broadcasting, the principles underlying them
could form the basis of efficient next generation media distribution tech-
nologies. In the short term, the transition from analog to digital transmis-
sion offers the promise of freeing "vast quantities of additional ... spec-
trum" that could greatly increase viewpoint diversity.' '
0
Lessening the need for regulation requires greater access to spectrum
by new entrants through not only technology but also through the FCC's
spectrum allocation policies. The approval of Low Power FM (LPFM)
technology provides the most apt example of this approach. In 2000, the
FCC created the LPFM service, which allows community broadcasters to
operate stations powered with 100 watts or fewer. 11 By limiting these sta-
tions to noncommercial educational broadcasters and explicitly excluding
current broadcast license holders and newspaper owners, the FCC helped
to ensure viewpoint diversity. 1 2 Unfortunately, by requiring a separation
of three channels between new LPFM stations and existing broadcasters,
Congress and the FCC prevented the creation of LPFM stations in most
major markets, where the station's small broadcasting range could reach
the largest audiences."
3
Finally, the FCC could reduce the need to regulate ownership of
broadcast stations by reinstituting the division between the creation and
distribution of content. The Financial Interest and Syndication Rules
108. See generally Raymond L. Pickholtz et. al., Theory of Spread-Spectrum Com-
munications-A Tutorial, [COM-30 NO.5] IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS
(May 1982).
109. See generally Joseph Mitola III, Cognitive Radio: An Integrated Agent Architec-
ture for Software Defined Radio, Royal Institute of Technology, May 8, 2000, available
at http://www.it.kth.se/-jmitola/MitolaDissertation8_lntegrated.pdf.
110. Media Access Project, Digital TV and the Spectrum Grab of 1997, at http://
www.mediaaccess.org/programs/digitaltv (last modified Aug. 24, 2000).
111. See In re Creation of Low Power Radio Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 2205, 2206 (2000).
112. See id. at 2206, 2217.
113. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.807 (2004) (modified by the 2001 Appropriations Act to
require third adjacent channel separation). In 2004, Sen. John McCain introduced legisla-
tion to eliminate the third-adjacent minimum distance separation requirements. See S.
2505, 108th Cong. (2004).
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("Fin-Syn Rules"), created by the FCC in 1970 and eliminated in the
1990s, precluded networks from obtaining a financial interest in the pro-
grams they broadcast beyond their initial airing and prohibited the devel-
opment of network controlled syndication enterprises. 1 4 The FCC in cre-
ating the Fin-Syn Rules hoped to encourage production of content inde-
pendent from the control of the networks that aired it. In the wake of the
elimination of the rules, the feared consolidation of production and distri-
bution has occurred. After the establishment of the Fin-Syn Rules, of the
top three television networks, only CBS was among the twenty leading
suppliers of prime time network content, accounting for just 2% of pro-
gramming. 1 " In 2002, years after the end of Fin-Syn, the CBS, ABC, and
NBC networks served as the top three prime time content suppliers, ac-
counting for over 63% of programming hours." 6 Re-imposition of rules
that limit the control networks can exert over the production of the pro-
gramming they air could contribute to program and viewpoint diversity,
lessening the need for media ownership regulation.
While none of the above suggestions could likely suffice to justify
complete deregulation of broadcast ownership, without these or similar
changes the need for continued stringent limits on media concentration
will remain pressing.
IV. THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION
The FCC's authority, as a federal administrative agency, derives from
Congress. The FCC serves as an agent of the legislature and its regulations
must comport with congressional goals. The FCC, however, has faced
ambivalence and inaction from Congress. After passing the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, which eliminated the national radio cap and paved the
way for further deregulation by demanding biennial reviews, Congress has
offered the FCC little guidance despite the continual litigation facing FCC
rulemakings.
While the deregulations of the early 1980s faced congressional opposi-
tion, those of the late 1990s were encouraged, if not demanded, by Con-
gress. 117 The FCC, in calling for further deregulation, is simply following
114. 47 C.F.R. § 73.659 (1994).
115. Mara Einstein, Program Diversity and the Program Selection Process on
Broadcast Network Television, Federal Communications Commission, Media Ownership
Work Group, Sept. 2002, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch
/DOC226838A10.pdf
116. Id.
117. See supra Part I.B.
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Congress's most recent mandate. Congress has yet to provide the FCC
with a clear signal that it no longer favors aggressive deregulation of
broadcasting. The initial Congressional outcry over The Order resulted in
only minor concessions to the apparent majority favoring a wholesale re-
jection of the new rules. Such congressional waffling sends a mixed mes-
sage to the FCC.
1 18
The need for clear and decisive legislation is compounded by the
courts' difficulty in resolving the disputes arising out of the FCC's rule
changes. As Prometheus makes clear, courts lack both the expertise and
authority necessary to adequately and effectively address the FCC's fail-
ure to craft appropriate media ownership policy. Courts are limited by
both the standard of administrative review as well as the binary decision-
making required in judicial proceedings. Courts may only accept or reject
the rules devised by the FCC, and, even then, only as demanded by the
"public interest" and "arbitrary and capricious" standards. Only Congress
is free to craft context-sensitive and creative solutions to issues of owner-
ship regulation that escape perpetual reviews by both the FCC under
§ 202(h) and the courts in suits such as Sinclair and Prometheus. Congress
must base its legislation on a careful consideration of the public good and
a sober evaluation of the existing media marketplace, one that accounts
for, but does not overestimate, the opportunities for diversity created by
new and developing technologies.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, though it resulted
from the misapplication of the standards of administrative review, finds
justification as a matter of policy. The faulty reasoning underlying the
FCC's rule changes explains the court's skepticism of the overzealous de-
regulatory efforts embodied in The Order. Ultimately, Congress must re-
assert itself as the ultimate authority responsible for the regulation of
broadcasters and provide the FCC with legislative guidance. While de-
regulation may prove an appropriate policy in the future, Congress must
recognize that until the media marketplace can secure widespread "dis-
semination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources" to the
American public in the absence of broadcast media ownership rules, the
regulations must remain.
119
118. See supra note 43.
119. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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